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78 
FREE RIDER: A JUSTIFICATION FOR 
MANDATORY MEDICAL INSURANCE 
UNDER HEALTH CARE REFORM? 
Douglas A. Kahn* & Jeffrey H. Kahn** † 
Section 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act1 added 
section 5000A to the Internal Revenue Code to require most individuals2 in 
the United States, beginning in the year 2014, to purchase an established 
minimum level of medical insurance. This requirement, which is enforced 
by a penalty imposed on those who fail to comply, is sometimes referred to 
as the “individual mandate.” The individual mandate is one element of a 
vast change to the provision of medical care that Congress implemented in 
2010. The individual mandate has proved to be controversial and has been 
the subject of a number of lawsuits contending that it is unconstitutional. It 
is not our purpose in this article to discuss its constitutionality. Rather, this 
piece focuses on the viability of one of the justifications that often is put 
forth for the adoption of the individual mandate: the “free-rider” problem. 
I. A CURE FOR THE FREE-RIDER PROBLEM 
A frequently stated defense of the individual mandate is that many per-
sons do not purchase medical insurance, even if they have the resources to 
do so, and then obtain free medical care when the need arises. The individu-
al mandate will require those persons (often referred to as “free riders”) to 
pay their share. For example, after the state of Massachusetts adopted a sim-
ilar medical welfare program, Governor Mitt Romney defended the 
inclusion of an individual mandate by saying, “[S]omeone has to pay for the 
health care that must, by law, be provided: Either the individual pays or the 
taxpayers pay. A free ride on the government is not libertarian.”3 By “tax-
payers,” Governor Romney means that the government pays when the 
                                                                                                                      
* Paul G. Kauper Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. 
** Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law. The authors would 
like to thank Professors Jill Horwitz, Nick Bagley, James Hines, Kyle Logue, and John Lopatka for 
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 1. Pub. Law No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and Educa-
tion Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. Law No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010) [hereinafter “2010 
Act”].  
 2. There are a number of categories of persons who are exempted from this mandate. I.R.C. 
§ 5000A(d)(2)–(4), (e) (West Supp. 2010). 
 3. Mitt Romney, Health Care for Everyone? We Found a Way, WALL ST. J., April 11, 2006, 
at A16.  
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individual does not. That is a bit of an overstatement. As we will see, the 
government pays only a small portion of the cost that is not borne by unin-
sured individuals. This same justification has been advanced in briefs in 
defense of the program and is often advanced in discussion of the program’s 
merits. For example, according to an Amici Curiae Brief written in defense 
of the program, “The only economic solution to [the free-rider problem] is 
to ensure broad participation in insurance pools by all people. The minimum 
coverage requirement is one way to do this.”4  
Given that only those without resources will qualify for free medical 
services when the need arises, we question the extent to which the free-rider 
problem exists. We conclude that the free-rider problem, if it exists at all, 
likely is of minor significance and can hardly be said to justify the adoption 
of an intrusive and expensive health care program. The actual congressional 
reason for adopting the program seems to rest on entirely different purposes 
(i.e., universal health coverage and the redistribution of wealth), and the 
debate over the desirability of the program should focus on the merits of 
those other purposes. Since universal health coverage cannot be achieved 
unless there is a redistribution of wealth, the latter objective is the focal 
point of the program. 
II. THE MEDICAL WELFARE PROGRAM’S VIABILITY DEPENDS ON AN 
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE OR A COMPARABLE PROVISION 
The medical welfare program that Congress adopted is not viable unless 
it includes an individual mandate or some comparable provision. The de-
fense of the individual mandate therefore is indirectly a defense of the entire 
program. It is worth considering whether the free-rider defense for the indi-
vidual mandate is valid since it bears on the determination of the merits of 
the entire program. Let us see why the individual mandate is essential to the 
2010 Act.  
First, section 2705 of the 2010 Act prohibits an insurer from denying in-
surance coverage to an applicant because of poor health. That provision 
creates an adverse selection problem, which, if unabated, would result in the 
pool of insured patients (“insureds”) consisting primarily of individuals who 
currently need medical services. If there were no individual mandate, many 
people would not purchase insurance until they had a medical condition. 
That adverse selection would make the premium cost of insurance prohibi-
tive because otherwise virtually all of the insureds would be receiving 
payments from the insurer that exceed their premiums. The program would 
fail either because large numbers of persons could not afford the insurance 
or because the insurance companies would exit the market.  
In addition to the adverse selection problem created by the 2010 Act, the 
individual mandate is also necessary to make insurance affordable for the 
elderly. If the elderly were charged the actuarially determined cost5 of insur-
                                                                                                                      
 4. Brief for Economic Scholars in Support of Appellees as Amici Curiae, Thomas More 
Law Center v. Barack Hussein Obama, 16 (6th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-2388) [hereinafter “Economic 
Scholars’ Brief”]. 
 5. The “actuarially determined cost” refers to the amount that accurately reflects the risk 
that the insured will incur a certain amount of medical expenses in the year of coverage. For exam-
ple, if data shows that 1 percent of individuals of X age and Y health will incur medical expenses of 
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ing them, the insurance would be too expensive for many to afford. To re-
duce this cost, healthy, young people must buy insurance and pay premiums 
in excess of the actuarial cost of their coverage to subsidize the elderly. It is 
this redistribution of wealth that appears to be the actual purpose of the act. 
Thus, the advancement of the free-rider justification has prevented the de-
bate over the merits of the program from focusing on the critical question of 
whether a redistribution of wealth from the young to the old and from the 
healthy to the unhealthy is an appropriate and desirable goal.  
In a commentary, Gregg D. Polsky proposed an alternative to the indi-
vidual mandate. 6 While it is beyond the scope of this piece to comment on 
that proposal, we will make one observation. Professor Polsky bases his 
proposal on the view that the purpose of the health reform program is not to 
require individuals to purchase insurance but rather is to prevent insurers 
from denying coverage to unhealthy applicants or to charge them higher 
premiums. To the contrary, insurers cannot afford to ignore the poor health 
of insured patients (“the insured”) in setting their premiums unless a large 
number of healthy individuals buy insurance and pay larger premiums than 
the value they receive. Consequently, an important purpose of the program 
is to force healthy individuals to be insured and thereby subsidize the cover-
age of the unhealthy.  
III. THE EXAGGERATION OF THE FREE-RIDER PROBLEM 
The free-rider defense appears convincing until one examines it closely. 
According to the Economic Scholars’ Brief mentioned above, there were 
approximately forty million persons in the United States who were unin-
sured in 2007. Fifty-seven percent of those uninsured persons used medical 
services that year. The Economic Scholars’ Brief cites a survey stating that, 
on average, the medical care costs of uninsured persons (“the uninsured”) 
amounts to about $2,000 per person each year, and over one-third of those 
costs are paid by the uninsured out of their own finances. How is the rest of 
that cost financed? The Economic Scholars’ Brief states that 32 percent of 
the overall cost of the uninsured’s medical services is obtained through an 
increase in the price of medical services. Consequently, patients who pay for 
their treatment—insured patients and those uninsured who pay completely 
for their own treatment—bear that portion of the shortfall. That accounts for 
about one-half of the cost that the uninsured do not pay.  
The Economic Scholars’ Brief states that 14 percent of the cost of the 
uninsured is borne by the government through Medicare, Medicaid, Veter-
ans Affairs services, TriCare (medical insurance for the military and their 
families), and workers’ compensation. That statement needs some refine-
ment: except for Medicaid, those are programs designed for specific 
purposes that have naught to do with whether the covered individuals would 
otherwise have private insurance. Indeed, it is unclear why people in those 
                                                                                                                      
$10,000 in the year of coverage, then the actuarial cost for one year’s medical coverage for an indi-
vidual of that age and health will be 1 percent x $10,000 = $100. That figure does not take into 
account administrative expenses that the premium also must cover.  
 6. Gregg D. Polsky, Commentary, Reconstructing the Individual Mandate As an Escrow 
Account, 109 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 73 (2011), http://www.michiganlawreview.org/ 
assets/fi/109/Polsky.pdf.  
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programs would be described as uninsured. If the government bears a por-
tion of the medical costs of the uninsured, it is only through any additional 
price that the providers impose on all who purchase medical services. This 
is merely one aspect of a medical provider’s shifting of costs to those who 
pay for medical treatment. As to Medicaid, the recipients are persons who 
could not afford to purchase insurance; the government is not picking up the 
tab for shirkers who have failed to pay their share of medical expenses. 
The image left by those who advance the free-rider defense is that the 
uninsured are parasites who choose to pass on their own medical costs to the 
rest of society by obtaining medical care without paying for it. That image 
does not reflect reality.  
Federal law requires that hospitals that take Medicare treat patients who 
come to their emergency rooms with emergency conditions regardless of 
whether those patients can pay for their treatment.7 The hospitals are not 
required to provide free treatment if the patients have the means to pay for 
it. The hospitals can and do collect from those with the means. As previous-
ly noted, more than one-third of the cost of treatment provided to uninsured 
patients is paid for by the uninsured patients themselves. It would seem that 
there are two likely reasons why the medical providers do not collect the 
remaining two-thirds of that cost. One reason is that many of the patients do 
not have the means to make the payments. The other reason is attributable to 
the collection methods employed by the medical providers. As to why the 
medical providers sometimes do not enforce collection from those who have 
the means but do not pay, it is likely that in most cases the amount involved 
is too small to justify the cost of pursuing collection. Those uninsured per-
sons who can afford to pay for their medical services and do not do so 
should be relatively few if the medical providers are diligent in collecting 
debts owed to them. 
Many people who cannot afford their medical costs also cannot afford to 
pay medical insurance premiums. As noted, the average cost of medical 
treatment to the uninsured is about $2,000 per person. Some will incur a 
larger expense, some a smaller expense, and some no expense at all. The 
cost of insurance likely exceeds $2,000 per year. In a letter to Senator Olivia 
Snow on January 11, 2010, the Director of the Congressional Budget Office 
(“CBO”) stated that the CBO estimates that in 2016 the annual premiums 
for a bronze level plan under a health insurance exchange program—the 
subsidized insurance program that is part of the 2010 Act—will average 
between $4,500 and $5,000 for an individual and between $12,000 and 
$12,500 for a family policy. The program will provide four progressively 
more expensive levels of insurance coverage—the “bronze,” “silver,” 
“gold,” and “platinum” levels. The bronze level will have the lowest pre-
mium available in the exchange program. Thus, a significant percentage of 
those who cannot pay for their medical costs now will not be able to afford 
to purchase insurance at more than twice the cost. To a lay reader, the cha-
racterization of a person as a free rider suggests that the person has 
voluntarily taken an action or inaction that imposes costs on others. Those 
who cannot afford insurance do not choose to be in this predicament; thus 
                                                                                                                      
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006). 
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the term is inappropriate to use in common parlance even if it may be within 
the economist’s use of the term. 
IV. THOSE WHO CANNOT AFFORD INSURANCE CONTINUE TO RELY 
ON OTHERS TO PAY THEIR MEDICAL COSTS 
Moreover, even if one is willing to describe those who cannot afford in-
surance as free riders, their reliance on outside help is not eliminated by the 
adoption of the 2010 Act. For taxable years after 2013, certain low- and 
moderate-income individuals who purchase insurance under a health insur-
ance exchange that the states are required to create will receive a refundable 
credit that subsidizes their purchase of that insurance.8 To qualify, the 
household income of an individual (the aggregate of the modified adjusted 
gross incomes of that individual and of all individuals for whom the taxpay-
er is allowed a dependent-exemption deduction and who are required to file 
a federal income tax return) must at least equal the poverty level and must 
not exceed four times the poverty level for a family of the size involved.9 
According to the Social Security Administration, the current poverty level 
for a single individual is $10,830; thus a single individual can have house-
hold income of as much as $43,320 and still qualify to have his insurance 
cost subsidized by the government. For a family of four, the current poverty 
level is $22,050; such a family can have household income as large as 
$88,200 and still qualify for a subsidy. Since the poverty-level figures are 
adjusted each year to reflect inflation, the allowable-income figures will be 
even higher in 2014 when these provisions first become effective. This 
scheme suggests that Congress believes that most of the persons with eligi-
ble incomes would not purchase insurance without a subsidy because they 
could not afford it. It is likely, therefore, that persons who are currently us-
ing medical services that are paid by others will continue to be subsidized 
under the new regime.  
Persons with low- and moderate-income levels may have fairly high in-
come and still qualify for government subsidies through the grant of 
refundable tax credits and by paying part of their co-payments. If such per-
sons would be considered free riders before the passage of the 2010 Act, 
they would seem to still fit that term after the passage of the act. Moreover, 
many of the persons who cannot afford to purchase insurance are exempted 
from the individual mandate and so are not required to be insured.10 Thus, 
the 2010 Act does not alter the fact that medical expenses of such persons 
will be borne by others (i.e., the taxpayers). If, contrary to their financial 
incentives, medical providers are not diligent in collecting payments from 
uninsured patients who actually can pay, the proper cure is for providers to 
improve their collection process rather than for the government to adopt an 
expensive and intrusive new medical care program. 
                                                                                                                      
 8. I.R.C. § 36B (West Supp. 2010).  
 9. § 36B(c)(1)(A). There are additional requirements that must be satisfied. 
 10. I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(1), (2), (5). 
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V. REDISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH  
It seems then that the pre-2010 free-rider problem is of minor conse-
quence and played a very small part, if any, in the decision to adopt the 
insurance mandate. Congress adopted the insurance mandate for two rea-
sons: (1) to deal with the adverse selection problem created by the 2010 
Act’s requirement that insurers provide insurance regardless of an appli-
cant’s health, and (2) to subsidize lower premiums for older or unhealthy 
insured persons. Congress facilitates the latter goal by requiring healthy, 
young persons to purchase insurance at a premium in excess of the actuarial 
cost of that coverage—meaning they pay more than the value they receive. 
Note, however, that some unmarried persons under the age of twenty-six are 
covered by their parents’ group insurance, and so they need not purchase 
insurance until they cease to be covered by their parents’ plan. It is ironic 
that the supporters of the insurance mandate complain that the current unin-
sured are passing on their medical costs to those who are insured when the 
health care program that supposedly cures that situation rests on allowing 
the elderly and unhealthy to pass on a portion of the cost of their insurance 
coverage to the young and healthy. To quote a venerable adage, it would 
seem that what is sauce for the goose would be sauce for the gander. 
The insurance mandate requires young, healthy people who are not cov-
ered by their parents’ insurance to purchase insurance at a cost that is greater 
than the value they receive. Although the 2010 Act permits insurers, in set-
ting rates, to take age into account, the act provides that the rates cannot 
vary by more than three to one for adults.11 The insurer also cannot take the 
health of the insured into account in setting a rate.12 The restriction on va-
riance allowed and exclusion of health considerations mean that the 
insurance mandate requires young, healthy people who are not covered by 
their parents’ insurance to purchase insurance at a cost that is greater than 
the value they receive.  
The Economic Scholars’ Brief contends that even the uninsured who do 
not incur medical expenses increase the cost of health insurance for those 
who purchase it. While that contention is intended to show that there is an 
externality that affects interstate commerce, it is also advanced as a justifi-
cation for requiring nearly universal health insurance coverage. The brief 
makes two points that purportedly demonstrate the correctness of that con-
tention. Under scrutiny, neither of those points holds up well. 
First, the Economic Scholars’ Brief argues that by not purchasing insur-
ance, which would increase the size of the pool of insureds, the uninsured 
raise the cost of insurance for those who purchase it. The only reason that 
the uninsured’s acquisition of insurance would lower the premium cost of 
those who already purchase insurance is for the premiums charged to the 
uninsured to be greater than the actuarial cost of their insurance. The healthy 
are deemed to have caused an externality because they chose not to subsid-
ize the medical expenses of the unhealthy. It seems a strained 
characterization of that consequence to call it an externality; but, if it is one, 
it is very different from the types of costs inflicted on others that the term 
                                                                                                                      
 11. § 2701(a)(1)(A)(iii). 
 12. See § 2701(a).  
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ordinarily refers to. A common example of an externality is the cost of fac-
tory pollutants on surrounding neighbors. The latter group must 
involuntarily bear the cost of sickness, decrease in property values, and oth-
er negative consequences so that the factory can continue its production for 
profit.  
By way of comparison, consider the case of a group of persons who de-
cide not to purchase automobiles and instead rely on public transportation. 
If those persons had purchased automobiles, there would have been more 
workers employed by automobile manufacturers and dealers. It seems more 
than strange to say that their failure to buy an automobile imposed an exter-
nality on those workers who were thereby deprived of employment. Yet, that 
is the essential thrust of the contention that the failure of the healthy to pur-
chase insurance imposes a cost on those who do purchase it. The 
circumstance of the healthy who do not purchase insurance is even further 
removed from causing an externality since the price of an automobile does 
not include a subsidy for others. 
Moreover, the increase of persons who are insured may cause an in-
crease in the demand for medical services—that is, an insured person is 
more likely to seek medical services than is an uninsured person. Economic 
principles suggest that an increase in demand that is not matched by an in-
crease in the available supply will cause a rise in the price charged for 
medical services. That increase in price may offset some of the reduction 
obtained by having a larger pool of insureds. 
Second, the brief argues that, based on empirical studies, when people 
who once refrained from buying insurance subsequently purchase it, they 
tend to incur larger medical care expenses than those who were insured ear-
lier in life. The suggested reason for this is that the uninsured do not use 
preventive medical care that would lower their future medical costs. It 
would seem that the proper response to that situation is to permit the insurer 
to charge a larger premium to those who were previously uninsured. If there 
is an externality here, it is caused by the failure of the insurer to charge the 
previously uninsured an actuarially accurate premium rather than by the 
uninsured’s decision not to purchase unneeded insurance. 
VI. THE DEBATE OVER THE MERITS OF THE 2010 ACT SHOULD 
FOCUS ON THE MERITS OF REDISTRIBUTION 
In conclusion, the 2010 Act is designed to redistribute wealth from the 
young and healthy to the elderly and ill. There are many governmental ac-
tivities and requirements that cause a redistribution of wealth. There is much 
to be said in favor of the 2010 Act’s redistribution and much to be said 
against it. Those discussing the merits and negatives of the health program 
would more likely respond to each other’s points and thereby reach a sound 
conclusion if the program were characterized honestly as a redistributive 
venture rather than as a solution to a free-rider problem that has little or no 
significance. 
The redistribution adopted in the 2010 Act is unusual in that it transfers 
wealth from the young to the old and from the healthy to the ill, whereas a 
traditional redistribution would seek to transfer wealth from those with 
money to the poor. In fact, the redistribution in the 2010 Act disregards the 
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income or wealth of either party except that the poor are excluded from both 
sides of the transfer. While there is nothing improper about that type of redi-
stribution, its unusual nature may have caused the proponents of the new 
welfare program to be fearful of declaring that redistribution is the actual 
primary purpose and function of the program. 
